

Time Firewall: Securing the GNSS receivers against Spoofing/Jamming

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
The need

- ✦ The GNSS systems are widely used for both *navigation* and *timing* in civilian infrastructures and military applications.
- ✦ Civil applications include synchronization of Communication networks, Energy companies, Financial institutions, computer networks and cellular base stations.




Motivation

- ✦ The GNSS signals could be easily *jammed* or *spoofed*, intentionally or unintentionally, thereby posing a serious threat on the performance and functioning of critical systems.



GPS spoofing using repeater which receive GPS signals and then retransmit them

GNSS spoofing: Black sea



Traditional solutions: Encrypted code

- ✦ **P(Y) /M-code or similar codes**
- ✦ **Prevent straightforward spoofing**

Disadvantages:

- ✦ **Improve immunity to jamming, but fail at high enough jamming power.**
- ✦ **SAASM receivers are only available to authorized /military customers**

Traditional solutions: multi constellations /frequencies

- ✦ Track multiple GNSS: GPS , Galileo , GLONASS, BeiDou, QZSS, IRNSS simultaneously
- ✦ Track multiple frequencies: for example: L1, L2 ,L5 of GPS

Disadvantages:

- ✦ Effective against simple spoofing.
- ✦ Force the advance spoofer to produce and transmit all possible GNSS signals simultaneously
- ✦ Require replacing existing GNSS receivers.


Traditional solutions: Adaptive antennas

- ✦ **Multiple antenna elements are used to adaptively change the apparent receiving strength of the antenna array, creating nulls in specific direction of the jammer/spoofers**
- ✦ **Spoofing /jamming detection is based on power / direction algorithm**


Disadvantages:

- ✦ **Effective against jamming, partly effective against spoofing**
- ✦ **Limited by the number of beams by the number of elements**
- ✦ **Limited against low power spoofing from different directions (especially for stationary receivers)**


Alternative solution



TFW concept



Spoofer



Time Fire Wall

↑
Spoofing Alert


RF signal →



GNSS receiver & Timing server



TFW: How it works

- ✦ A novel algorithm detect spoofing by comparing the received time versus the correct time from the atomic clock
- ✦ The algorithm used the validated time received from the GPS for updates of the atomic clock
- ✦ The timing and location data is delivered to the GPS simulator which translate them to RF signals




Spoofing Detection : using reference


The high stability of the atomic clock is used as reference for the spoofing detector




Spoofing




Time Firewall



TFW for moving systems




Rack mount Time Fire Wall




Key Attributes of the TimeFireWall™

- ✓ Ensures Accurate Time during a GNSS Jamming or Spoofing attack
- ✓ Easy to install without disruption to existing legacy equipment
- ✓ Remote updates with new algorithms using the LAN
- ✓ Patented Solution

Testing setup




Testing setup



TFW: results


- ✦ 1PPS long-term stability (Peak to peak): 110ns
- ✦ 1PPS short-term stability (RMS): 15ns (limited by receiver)



Spooing detected!!!

TFW: results

- ✦ 1PPS from 2 different customer GPS receivers which receive the SAME TFW signal
- ✦ The yellow is the 1pps reference from atomic clock
- ✦ Noise and offset are limited by the receiver, not the TFW!



Summary

- ✦ **GNSS systems can be easily jammed or spoofed**
- ✦ **Existing solution for civilian markets are limited**
- ✦ **Time FireWall can easily be inserted into a legacy timing solutions between GNSS antenna and time server**
- ✦ **Time FireWall output is L1 GPS RF signal with holdover of ~1us per day based on Rb clock.**

Back Up

TFW Roadmap

